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Abstract. Critical infrastructure systems like power grid require an improved 
critical information infrastructure (CII) that can not only help in monitoring of 
the critical entities but also take part in failure analysis and self-healing. Effi-
cient designing of a CII is challenging as each kind of communication technol-
ogy has its own advantages and disadvantages. Wired networks are highly scal-
able and secure, but they are neither cost effective nor dynamic in nature. Wire-
less communication technologies on the other hand are easy to deploy, low cost 
etc. but they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In order to optimize cost, power 
consumption, dynamic nature, accuracy and scalability a hybrid communication 
network is designed in this paper where a portion of the communication net-
work is built using wireless sensor networks (WSN) and the rest is a wired net-
work of fiber optic channels. To offer seamless operation of the hybrid commu-
nication network and provide security a Secure Smart Grid Monitoring Tech-
nique (SSGMT) is also proposed. The performance of the proposed hybrid CII 
for the generation and transmission system of power grid coupled with the 
SSGMT during different cyber-attacks is tested using NS2 simulator. The simu-
lation results show that the SSGMT for a joint power communication network 
of IEEE 118-Bus system performs better than the prevailing wireless CIIs like 
Lo-ADI and Modified AODV. 
Keywords: Critical Information Infrastructure, Wireless Sensor Network, 
Cyber-attacks, Remote Monitoring, Smart sensor nodes, Smart Grid. 
1 Introduction 
An improved and efficient Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) for a Critical In-
frastructure System (CIS) gives birth to a smart CIS. It is the incorporation of features 
like full-duplex communication between the CII entities by the addition of embedded 
systems, automated metering in the smart homes, power distribution automation, per-
vasive monitoring etc., that converts a traditional power grid to a smart grid system. It 
is beyond any question that the CII of a smart grid must be accurate, scalable, and 
secure enough to instantly identify any kind of abnormal behavior in the entities of 
the power network, securely communicate that information to the control center and 
thereby help in taking necessary and timely action to ensure uninterrupted power 
supply. 
As a result, finding the best suited design of a robust CII for smart grid has become 
a boiling topic of research. In [1] a crude idea of the design of a joint power-
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communication network is given using a test system consisting of 14 buses. Yet, the 
ground level details of the CII system are missing. The authors of [2], have come up 
with a realistic design of the CII of a smart grid by taking help from a power utility in 
the U.S. Southwest; their CII system relies completely on wired channels that either 
use SONET-over-Ethernet or Ethernet-over-Dense Wavelength Division Multiplex-
ing. However, a completely wired CII is neither cost effective nor energy saving. 
Every CII entity in [2] draws power and thus a huge amount of power is devoted for 
monitoring the power network itself. Moreover, isolation of CII entities during a fail-
ure or a security threat and addition of a new entity in the network for hardening pur-
pose or fault tolerance is extremely difficult and costly in a wired system.  
Smart sensors like Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) are already gaining popular-
ity in smart grid system for measuring electrical waves. Power generation and trans-
mission, power quality, equipment fitness, load capacity of equipment and load bal-
ancing in the grid can also be monitored by data sensing techniques. WSNs are com-
prised of low powered sensor nodes with easy installation process, lesser maintenance 
requirement, low installation cost, low power profile, high accuracy and scalability. 
All these have convinced the researchers that WSNs are a very good choice for the 
designing of the CII of a smart grid. However, the most common drawback of a sen-
sor node is that it is battery powered and it is not easy to replace its dead battery. As a 
result, energy conservation becomes important. In the proposed work, energy effi-
ciency is obtained by both energy aware routing technique for Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) data transmission and by the use of more expensive 
rechargeable Energy Harvesting Relay Nodes (EHRNs) for PMU data transmission to 
the Control Centers (CC). Also, the nodes and wireless channels are vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks. Some of the common cyber-attacks in WSNs are discussed in [3]. 
 In this paper, a hybrid CII is designed in which a WSN based communication net-
work is used between a sensing unit placed at a substation like a Remote Terminal 
Unit (RTU) or a PMU and a regional aggregation point like a Regional Sink node 
(RS) or Phasor Data Concentrator; and optical fiber based communication is used 
between the regional aggregation point and the CCs. SSGMT aims at securing the 
sensed data by means of light weight security protocols used in [4] like Elliptic-
Curve-Public-Key Cryptography (ECC), Elliptic-Curve-Diffie-Helman Key exchange 
scheme (ECDH), Nested Hash Message Authentication Codes (NHMAC) and RC5 
symmetric cypher. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
CII system setup phase for SSGMT. Mitigation of different threats to the proposed 
network design is discussed in section 3 by adopting a secure routing technique. Sec-
tion 4 does performance analysis of the proposed scheme SSGMT by means of com-
paring the simulation results with other existing secure remote monitoring technique 
for power grid like Lo-ADI [5] and Modified AODV [6]. Sections 5 concludes the 
paper and discusses the scope for future works. 
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2 Overview of the CII system setup phase for SSGMT 
In order to provide a reliable remote monitoring technique for the smart grid, a gener-
ic hybrid CII system design is proposed in this section that can be applied on any 
given power network.  In order to illustrate the steps of CII design, the generation and 
transmission part of a power grid formed by the IEEE 14-Bus system is considered. 
 
Fig. 1. Critical Information Infrastructure Design for a Smart Grid of IEEE 14-Bus 
Initially, a given power grid is divided into several substations based on [7]. In 
Fig.1, the IEEE 14-Bus system is divided into 11 substations. After the substation 
division, two substations having the highest and second highest connectivity with 
other substations are selected as Main and backup CCs respectively. As the CCs are 
selected, all substations are equipped with a router acting as a gateway (𝐺𝑊𝑖) and a 
substation server is placed in each CC acting as the access point for the operator. The 
CC- gateways can receive optical signals from the optical channels and convert them 
to electrical signals using a photodiode and send those data to server via a wired LAN 
connection. Other 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠  can receive data from the sensors in that substation via 
Zigbee and forward that to either the non-rechargeable relay nodes or the EHRNs. 
The distance between all pairs of substations (𝑆𝑖& 𝑆𝑗) is calculated as in [2]. Now, 
starting from a substation 𝑆𝑖 with the maximum connectivity among the border sub-
stations, all other substations which are within a given distance D of 𝑆𝑖, are marked as 
substations of a common monitoring region 𝑅𝑥. D is determined on the basis of net-
work size and average distance between substations. Then the next substation which 
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is the closest to 𝑆𝑖 but beyond the given distance and which is not yet placed in a 
monitoring region, is selected and the same process is repeated. This process is con-
tinued till every substation is placed within a particular 𝑅𝑥. In Fig.1, 𝑆1 is selected as 
the main CC and 𝑆2 is selected as the backup CC. Substations 𝑆3, 𝑆4, 𝑆5 and 𝑆10 are at 
the borders of the smart grid area. Among them, 𝑆4 has the maximum connectivity, 
therefore the region division starts from it and finally, the smart grid network for 
IEEE 14-Bus system is divided into 3 monitoring regions. 
In SSGMT, two different types of Zigbee enabled smart sensors are considered for 
monitoring the power network entities. The first type is the Measuring Unit (MU) 
based smart sensors [8] connected to an RTU for measuring SCADA input data and 
the second type is the Zigbee enabled PMU-based smart sensors or ZPMU [9].  
In this step, MU-based sensors (𝑀𝑖) are placed at every bus but PMU-based sen-
sors (𝑃𝑖) are placed at some of the buses using an optimal PMU placement algorithm 
[7]. If there are multiple 𝑀𝑖s in a substation then RTU receives the data from all such 
𝑀𝑖 s before forwarding them to the substation gateway ( 𝐺𝑊𝑖 ). Low-cost, non-
rechargeable battery enabled relay nodes are randomly dispersed across the network 
area. These relay nodes can carry the SCADA data to a RS placed at every monitoring 
region. Each RSs is either connected to a neighboring RS or a CC-gateway via optical 
fiber channels to form a ring structure in order to provide fault tolerance. These RSs 
now convert the electrical signals obtained from the relay nodes to optical signals 
using a light emitting diode, associated with each RS. These optical signals are then 
carried to the CC-gateways via optical fiber channels and other RSs in the ring. TCP 
based communication is used between the RSs and the CC-gateway.  
A phasor data concentrator (PDC), responsible for receiving and accumulating 
PMU data from multiple PMUs, is also placed at each region of the smart grid and 
few EHRNs are randomly deployed across the smart grid region. The idea behind the 
deployment of the two kinds of sensor nodes is that, the cheaper non-rechargeable 
relay nodes will follow an event-driven hierarchical routing approach to send the 
SCADA data and the EHRNs will always be active to accumulate synchrophasor data 
from the substations of each region and send the data to the local PDCs and finally to 
the CC-gateways. Due to the high volume of PMU data transfer from each substation 
having a PMU, the sensor nodes carrying them should always be active. IEEE 
C37.118 standard is maintained for communication of PMU data to the PDCs. PDCs 
can convert the data to optical signals in the similar way as RSs and send that to the 
CC-gateways either directly or via other PDCs in neighboring regions. PDCs also use 
TCP based communication to send the optical data to CCs.  
3 Secure Smart Grid Monitoring Technique (SSGMT)  
The goal of the CII for a smart grid is to securely transmit the sensed data from the 
sensors to the CCs and help in remote monitoring of the power grid. In order to 
achieve this with the help of a hybrid CII, the SSGMT is divided into 3 modules and 
described in this section. 
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3.1 Module 1: Data sensing by substation sensors and forwarding to 
substation gateways 
In the first module of SSGMT, the 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖  sensors placed in the substations sense 
electrical waves from the buses they are placed on and use Zigbee to send the data to 
the substation gateway 𝐺𝑊𝑖. No security measure is adopted in this step as it is as-
sumed that no cyber attack can harm the communication within a substation.  
3.2 Module 2: Data forwarding by substation gateways to RSs and PDCs 
The next phase of the hybrid CII system of SSGMT is data forwarding by 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠. 𝐺𝑊𝑖 
Use two separate methods for forwarding 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖  data. First, the trust values (𝑇𝑉𝑖) 
of the non-rechargeable nodes (𝑁𝑖) and EHRNs are determined by the 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑠 of that 
region by means of forwarding a number of test messages through them to the RSs 
and PDCs of that region respectively. The 𝑇𝑉𝑖  of each node is calculated using eq.1. 
                                               𝑇𝑉𝑖 =
𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 100                                           (1) 
It is assumed that all the CII entities are provided with a global key 𝐺𝐵𝐾 which an 
attacker cannot get hold of even if the entity is compromised. Also, a unique set of 
elliptic curves is stored in the memory of each CII entity for the purpose of ECC and 
ECDH protocols [4]. Also, in order to achieve those mechanisms, it is assumed that 
any pair of entities in the network agrees upon all the domain parameters of the ellip-
tic curves stored in them. Now, rest of module 2 is described using the flowchart be-
low. 
 
 
RC5 symmetric cipher [4] is used for the encryption of data using the shared se-
cret. The GBK is used by 𝐺𝑊𝑖 to generate a Hashed Message Authentication Code 
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(HMAC) [4] over both the encrypted SCADA and PMU data and attached with the 
encrypted data for the purpose of authentication of data. Eq 2. is used to select the 
cluster head. 𝑁𝑖  nodes receiving data from 𝐺𝑊𝑖  and with highest Candidate Value 
(𝐶𝑉𝑖) is selected as the cluster head.  
                                                 𝐶𝑉𝑖 = 𝐵𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑉𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑛𝑖                                                            (2) 
In eq.2,  𝐵𝑃𝑖 represents remaining battery power of 𝑁𝑖, 𝑇𝑉𝑖  is the current trust val-
ue of 𝑁𝑖 and 𝐶𝑛𝑖  is the connectivity of 𝑁𝑖 with other nodes in the region. The same 
path to send data to RSs and PDCs is followed by each 𝐺𝑊𝑖 until the RSs or PDCs 
send a rerouting request to the corresponding 𝐺𝑊𝑖. 
3.3 Module 3: Data forwarding by RSs and PDCs to CC-gateways 
In this module, the RSs and PDCs after obtaining the encrypted and HMAC-ed data 
from the 𝑁𝑠 and EHRNs use the shared secret obtained for that sender 𝐺𝑊𝑖 to decrypt 
the data packets. They also match the HMAC attached with the encrypted data to 
check if any false data injection took place. In case, the HMAC does not match, the 
data packet is dropped, and rerouting request is sent back to the sender. The main CC-
server use ECC based public key cryptography [4] and generate a public key for en-
cryption and a private key for decryption of data. The ECC based public key of the 
main CC-server is sent to each of the RSs through the RS-ring and also to the PDCs 
via other PDCs and the optical channels. The main CC-gateway use a dedicated and 
secure optical channel to communicate with the backup CC-gateway. This channel is 
used to share the private key with the backup CC-server. RSs are responsible for data 
aggregation. Aggregated SCADA data from the 𝑁𝑠 are encrypted by the RSs using 
the public key of the main CC-server. This encrypted data is sent to both the CC-
gateways via the RS-ring. In the similar way PDCs send the aggregated and encrypted 
synchrophasor data via other PDCs to the CC-gateways wherefrom they reach the 
CC-servers. 
4 Simulation Results 
    
Fig. 2. Communication delay vs. Malicious nodes      Fig. 3. Number of compromised nodes vs. 
Packet drop  
7 
In this section, the CII for a smart grid network of IEEE 118-Bus system is consid-
ered. The total network region is divided into 8 regions and the power grid is divided 
into 107 substations. Substation 61 is selected as the main CC and it consists of 3 
buses─68,69 and 116. Substation 16, consisting of buses─17 and 30, is selected as the 
backup CC. In order to analyze the performance of SSGMT in this network setup, a 
total of 1500 non-rechargeable relay nodes, 500 EHRNs and 8 PDCs are deployed in 
the network area and NS2.29 is used for simulation. The simulation results are com-
pared with existing WSN based CII systems like Lo-ADI [5] and modified AODV 
[6]. 
5 Conclusion and Future Works 
The region based remote monitoring adopted by SSGMT helps in easy identification 
of a failure in the power grid or an attack in the communication network of the smart 
grid. SSGMT obtains data privacy by the encryption/decryption mechanisms, data 
integrity and authenticity by the HMACs. Delay, security, power consumption, scala-
bility etc. are optimized by this hybrid network design of SSGMT. Designing a threat 
model with attacks on smart sensors, gateways or servers and analyzing the effect of 
cyber-attacks on power grid can be another direction of future work. 
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